The impossibility of unbiased judgement aggregation

Franz Dietrich and C. List
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C. List: Externe publicaties SBE
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Alexander Grigoriev

No 49, Research Memorandum from Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR)

Abstract: All existing impossibility theorems on judgment aggregation over logically connected propositions have one of two restrictions: they either use a controversial systematicity condition or apply only to special agendas of propositions with rich logical connections. An important open question is whether judgment aggregation faces any serious impossibilities without these restrictions. Here we prove the first impossibility theorem without systematicity that applies to all standard agendas: there exists no judgment aggregation rule satisfying universal domain, collective rationality, anonymity and a new condition called unbiasedness. For many agendas, anonymity can be weakened. Applied illustratively to (strict) preference aggregation represented in the judgment aggregation model, our result implies that every unbiased social welfare function with universal domain depends only on a single individual.

Date: 2005-01-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: The impossibility of unbiased judgment aggregation (2010)
Working Paper: The impossibility of unbiased judgment aggregation (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:unm:umamet:2005049

DOI: 10.26481/umamet.2005049

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