Non-Cooperative Solutions for Claims Problems

M. Atlamaz, C. Berden, Hans Peters and A.J. Vermeulen
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C. Berden: Quantitative Economics
A.J. Vermeulen: Quantitative Economics, RS: GSBE ETBC
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Bertrand Candelon, Robert Vermeulen and Dries Vermeulen

No 38, Research Memorandum from Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR)

Abstract: In a claims problem an estate has to be divided among several claimants whose total claim exceeds the size of the estate. This paper extends the noncooperative approach, initiated by O’Neill (1982), by allowing players to put multiple claims on the same part of the estate, and by considering the case where individual claims may exceed the estate. A full characterization of the set of Nash equilibria is obtained both for restricted claims problems, where individual claims do not exceed the estate, and for the general case. Variations on the claim game are considered, which result in proportional division in equilibrium.

Date: 2008-01-01
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:unm:umamet:2008038

DOI: 10.26481/umamet.2008038

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