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On the manipulability of approval voting and related scoring rules

Hans Peters, Souvik Roy () and A.J.A. Storcken
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A.J.A. Storcken: Quantitative Economics

No 60, Research Memorandum from Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR)

Date: 2009-01-01
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Journal Article: On the manipulability of approval voting and related scoring rules (2012) Downloads
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:unm:umamet:2009060

DOI: 10.26481/umamet.2009060

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