Partial coercion, conditional cooperation, and self-commitment in voluntary contributions to public goods
Elena Cettolin () and
No 41, Research Memorandum from Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR)
In this paper we experimentally investigate whether partial coercion can in combination withconditional cooperation increase contributions to a public good. We are especially interested inthe behavior of the non-coerced populations. The main finding is that in our setting conditionalcooperation is not a strong enough force to increase contribution levels. Although, non-coercedsubjects rationally adjust their beliefs about contribution behavior of coerced subjects they donot increase their own contributions to the public good accordingly. This points to the limits ofthe actual strength of conditional cooperation and puts some doubt on the idea that it is crucialin overcoming social dilemma problems.
Keywords: public economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Partial Coercion, Conditional Cooperation, and Self-Commitment in Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:unm:umamet:2011041
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