The lowest-bid all-pay-auction as a fundraising mechanism: theoretically optimal but behaviorally fragile

Damian Damianov and Ronald Peeters
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Roxanne Korthals

No 50, Research Memorandum from Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR)

Date: 2012-01-01
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Downloads: (external link)
https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ws/files/6768 ... fda07ef-ASSET1.0.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:unm:umamet:2012050

DOI: 10.26481/umamet.2012050

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Research Memorandum from Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Andrea Willems () and Leonne Portz ().