Transaction Cost Politics, Institutions for Commitment and Rent Seeking

Mansoob Murshed

No DP2001-125, WIDER Working Paper Series from World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER)

Abstract: In developing countries, particularly in those countries that have experienced declining growth rates, institutional failure (bad policies) is closely related to development failure and growth collapses. This paper addresses the issues of commitment, compromise and rent seeking, all of which are relevant to institutional design and the formulation of optimal policies. The models in the paper are within the genre of endogenous policy formation, transaction cost politics, and models of rent seeking.

Keywords: Decision making (Finance; Public); Game theory; Transaction costs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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