Analyzing Corruption Possibilities in the Gaze of the Media

Samarth Vaidya

No DP2001-30, WIDER Working Paper Series from World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER)

Abstract: In this paper I analyze the economic incentives that govern the strategic relationship between the government and the independent media using a consistent analytical framework. The analysis focuses on the extent to which the 'free' press can act as a deterrent to corruption in governance.

Keywords: Game theory; Government accountability; Corruption; Mass media (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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Working Paper: Analyzing Corruption Possibilities in the Gaze of the Media (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:unu:wpaper:dp2001-30

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