Credibility and Reputation in Peacemaking

Tony Addison and Mansoob Murshed

No DP2001-45, WIDER Working Paper Series from World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER)

Abstract: The paper analyses credibility and reputation in the context of peace negotiations. Where war provides economic gains to one side, peace is not incentive compatible, and peace agreements will necessarily degenerate, as they become time inconsistent. Levels of conflict are an increasing function of greed and rents, but decreasing in the direct costs of war. In a multiple period framework there is some uncertainty regarding the type of negotiator and for high values of the discount rate more conflict is chosen.

Keywords: Economic assistance and foreign aid; Game theory; Social conflict (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Credibility and Reputationin Peacemaking (2010)
Journal Article: Credibility and Reputation in Peacemaking (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:unu:wpaper:dp2001-45

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