Violence Against Civilians in Civil Wars: Looting or Terror?

Jean-Paul Azam () and Anke Hoeffler ()

No DP2001-46, WIDER Working Paper Series from World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER)

Abstract: A simple two-stage game-theoretic model of conflict is analysed, where the government can send raiders for terrorising the population to flee before the fighting proper begins. The resulting displacement of population reduces the efficiency of the guerrilla in the fight against the government. Conditions are spelled out for a sub-game perfect equilibrium to exist where terror substitutes for fighting, when the government can afford it.

Keywords: Econometric models (Economic development); Game theory; Social conflict; War (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (20)

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Journal Article: Violence Against Civilians in Civil Wars: Looting or Terror? (2002)
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