Conflict in Africa: The Cost of Peaceful Behaviour

Tony Addison, Philippe Le Billon and Mansoob Murshed

No DP2001-51, WIDER Working Paper Series from World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER)

Abstract: War provides economic opportunities, such as the capture of valuable natural resources, that are unavailable in peacetime. However, belligerents may prefer low-intensity conflict to total war when the former has a greater pay-off. The paper therefore uses a two-actor model to capture the continuum from total war to complete peace that often characterises Africa's conflicts.

Keywords: Economic assistance and foreign aid; Game theory; Natural resources; Social conflict (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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Journal Article: Conflict in Africa: The Cost of Peaceful Behaviour (2002)
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