Fuelling War or Buying Peace: the Role of Corruption in Conflicts

Philippe Le Billon

No DP2001-65, WIDER Working Paper Series from World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER)

Abstract: Corruption is endogenous to many political structures and serves key functions beyond the self-interest of public officials and politicians. Like violence, corruption participates in political ordering and, although corruption may in itself play a corrosive role on economies and rule-based institutions, it forms part of the fabric of social relations. This endogenous character means that conflicts may arise more from changes in the pattern of corruption, than from corruption itself. Domestic or external shocks affecting this pattern may lead to open conflicts reducing corruption.

Keywords: Corruption; Public administration; Social conflict (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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