Transnational Terrorism as a Spillover of Domestic Disputes in Other Countries

Tony Addison and Mansoob Murshed

No DP2002-120, WIDER Working Paper Series from World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER)

Abstract: This paper models transnational terrorism as a three-way strategic interaction involving a government that faces armed opposition at home, which may spill over in the form of acts of terrorism by the state's opponents against the government's external sponsor. The external sponsor also utilizes deterrence against potential terrorists, which only lowers terrorism if terrorists are not intrinsically motivated by a deep-seated sense of humiliation. A rise in the external power's preference for deterrence against terrorism may backfire in these circumstances.

Keywords: Conflict management; Game theory; Social conflict; War (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Transnational terrorism as a spillover of domestic disputes in other countries (2005)
Working Paper: Transnational terrorism as a spillover of domestic disputes in other countries (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:unu:wpaper:dp2002-120

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