Hardening a Soft Budget Constraint Through 'Upward Devolution' to a Supranational Institution: The Case of Italian State-Owned Firms and the European Union

Elisabetta Bertero and Laura Rondi

No DP2002-16, WIDER Working Paper Series from World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER)

Abstract: This paper contributes to the literature on the role of decentralization in hardening the budget constraint of public enterprises. Following Qian and Roland the study adopts a 'federalist' approach. However, it interprets federalism as the upward devolution of domestic economic policies to a supranational authority and examines its role in disciplining public enterprises operating in a soft budget regime. The methodology is a case study of the shift in budget regime in Italy in the late 1980s.

Keywords: Budget; Government business enterprises; Government spending policy; International obligations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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