Enforcing Peace Agreements through Commitment Technologies
S. Mansoob Murshed and
Philip Verwimp ()
No RP2008-45, WIDER Working Paper Series from World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER)
This paper models the instability of peace agreements, motivated by the empirical regularity with which peace agreements tend to break down following civil war. When war provides opportunities for profit to one side, or when other difficulties such as historical grievances exist, peace may become incentive incompatible. The party that has something to gain from surprise warfare may agree to peace, but will later renege on it. It is shown that the levels of conflict chosen by this group are an increasing function of both grievance and greed, but decreasing in the direct costs of war.
Keywords: Conflict management; Dispute resolution (Law); Sanctions (International law); War (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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