Foreign Aid as Prize: Incentives for a Pro-Poor Policy

Tejashree Sayanak and Sajal Lahiri

No RP2008-63, WIDER Working Paper Series from World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER)

Abstract: We develop a theoretical model of foreign aid to analyse a method of disbursement of aid which induces the recipient government to follow a more pro-poor policy than it otherwise would do. In our two-period model, aid is given in the second period and the volume of it depends on the level of wellbeing of the target group in the first period. We find that this way of designing aid does increase the welfare of the poor.

Keywords: Economic assistance and foreign aid; Game theory; Public welfare (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dev
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.wider.unu.edu/sites/default/files/rp2008-63.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Foreign Aid as Prize: Incentives for a Pro‐Poor Policy (2009)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:unu:wpaper:rp2008-63

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in WIDER Working Paper Series from World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Siméon Rapin ().