Unintended consequences of economic sanctions for human rights: Conflict minerals and infant mortality in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Dominic Parker, Jeremy Foltz and David Elsea

No wp-2016-124, WIDER Working Paper Series from World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER)

Abstract: Are victims of human rights abuses better off with or without economic sanctions targeted at their perpetrators? We study this question in the context of a US human rights policy, Section 1502 of the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act. By discouraging companies from sourcing 'conflict minerals' from the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, the policy has acted as a de facto boycott on mineral purchases that may finance warlords and armed militias.

Keywords: Sanctions; Infant mortality; Civil conflict; Conflict minerals; Dodd-Frank Act; Democratic Republic of the Congo; Resource certification (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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