Deflecting my burden, hindering redistribution: How elites influence tax legislation in Latin America

Juan A. Bogliaccini and Juan Pablo Luna

No wp-2016-92, WIDER Working Paper Series from World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER)

Abstract: This paper proposes to understand a singular but salient factor that enables the wealthy to deflect their tax burden downwards: elites' political leverage to shape legislation via their capacity to influence political actors and policy outcomes. The analysis sheds light on alternative mechanisms used by economic elites over time and space. Our analysis of the political economy of taxing upper-income groups in Chile and Uruguay reveals the importance of continuous political agency on the part of organized elite interest groups.

Keywords: Equality and inequality; Revenue; Tax evasion; Taxation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:unu:wpaper:wp-2016-92

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