EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Unofficial sovereign wealth funds and duration in power in Africa

Larissa Nawo, Désiré Avom, Kyle McNabb and Luc Nembot

No wp-2019-57, WIDER Working Paper Series from World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER)

Abstract: This paper argues that in weak states, leaders whose hold on power is secured by the public fortune have turned to the use of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs), especially unofficial SWFs, to cement their hold on power. Unofficial SWFs are private funds created from resource rents with the appearance of public investment-holding firms that use governmental legitimacy to invest at home and abroad, managed indirectly by political leaders or their families in order to advance a political agenda, wealth accumulation, patronage, repression, and loyalty.

Keywords: Autonomy; Natural resources; political survival; ruling elites; Unofficial SWFs; Politician; political leaders (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.wider.unu.edu/sites/default/files/Publ ... r/PDF/wp-2019-57.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:unu:wpaper:wp-2019-57

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in WIDER Working Paper Series from World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Siméon Rapin ().

 
Page updated 2020-05-19
Handle: RePEc:unu:wpaper:wp-2019-57