Moral reputation and political selection in a decentralized democracy: Theory and evidence from India

Prasenjit Banerjee, Vegard Iversen, Sandip Mitra, Antonio Nicolo' and Kunal Sen

No wp-2020-26, WIDER Working Paper Series from World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER)

Abstract: What motivates individuals to become politicians? This is an important question in decentralized democracies, where local politicians play a key role in public goods provision. However, and in emerging economies, bureaucratic hurdles and administrative failures introduce uncertainty about the returns to a politician's effort towards public goods provision. This paper presents a theoretical enquiry of political selection in the presence of such uncertainty.

Keywords: Politician; Experiments; Reputation; India (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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