Clientelism and development: is there a poverty trap?

Susan Stokes

No wp-2021-91, WIDER Working Paper Series from World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER)

Abstract: There are sound theoretical reasons to expect clientelism to suppress economic growth: politicians who garner support by offering employment to voters and grassroots party members can do so more effectively when the voters' participation constraint is met with low wages. Hence, clientelism can become a poverty trap. Yet in many countries, the heyday of political clientelism coincided with periods of rapid economic growth. I offer preliminary evidence of this coincidence of clientelism and economic growth in several OECD countries, at earlier stages of development.

Keywords: Clientelism; political competition; Public policy; Poverty traps (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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