Constraints on the executive and tax revenues in the long run

Antonio Savoia, Kunal Sen and Abrams M.E. Tagem

No wp-2022-4, WIDER Working Paper Series from World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER)

Abstract: We argue that tax revenues and political institutions placing constraints on the executive power may reinforce each other over time and so co-evolve in the long run. This may also bring a shift in the composition of revenues, from taxes levied on a narrow base to broadly levied taxes. To test these hypotheses, we use historical cross-country data covering 31 countries for 1800-2012 and panel time series methods allowing for different forms of country-specific heterogeneity and cross-section dependence. The results offer three main findings.

Keywords: Constraints on the executive; Tax revenue; Institutions; SDG17; Government tax revenue (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pbe and nep-pub
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Journal Article: Constraints on the executive and tax revenues in the long run (2023)
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