Power, institutions, and state-building after war: A controlled comparison of Rwanda and Burundi

Omar Shahabudin McDoom

No wp-2023-29, WIDER Working Paper Series from World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER)

Abstract: I examine whether and how the means through which a civil war ends affects the success of a country's state-building strategy after conflict. I show that two distinct modes of conflict termination—military victories and negotiated settlements—lead to differential long-run state-building outcomes and offer an explanation of the mechanism behind the divergence. In a military victory, the coercive balance-of-power at the end of war favourable to the victor enables it to dictate the post-conflict institutional design and skew power formally in its favour.

Keywords: Civil conflict; Political settlements; Statebuilding (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-afr and nep-his
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