Dishonesty concessions in teams: Theory and experimental insights from local politicians in India

Arnab K. Basu, Nancy H. Chau, Anustup Kundu and Kunal Sen

No wp-2024-87, WIDER Working Paper Series from World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER)

Abstract: Economic theory predicts that dishonesty thrives in secrecy. Yet, team-based decisions are ubiquitous in public policy-making. How does teamwork influence the tendency for self-dealings when public servants—both honest and corrupt—must work together to make decisions under the veil of within-group secrecy? This paper designs a field experiment guided by a theoretical model of team-level dishonesty, where we define and unpack the drivers of the dishonesty concessions that individuals make in a team setting as a cooperative bargain between team players.

Keywords: Dishonest behaviour; Peer effect; Bargaining; Local government (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-spo
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