The illusion of criminal 'order': institutional trust and municipal finances in Mexico

Ana Isabel López Garciá, Seung-hun Lee and Juan P. Figueroa Mansur

No wp-2025-72, WIDER Working Paper Series from World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER)

Abstract: Do criminal groups which help maintain order strengthen the fiscal contract or weaken it? This paper examines how the presence of organized-crime groups shapes Mexican municipalities' ability to collect revenue, deliver public goods, and earn citizens' trust. Survey data show that residents living in neighbourhoods home to organized crime report lower levels of trust in local government, regardless of whether those groups provide 'order' or engage in extortion and violence.

Keywords: Local government; Trust; Fiscal policy; Public goods; Crime (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law and nep-ure
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