When development bargains are absent

Stefan Dercon

No wp-2026-116, WIDER Working Paper Series from World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER)

Abstract: A development bargain is an elite bargain in which those with power and influence share a commitment to pursue growth and development. Aid works best where a development bargain exists, yet it is needed most where one is absent. This paper maps what outsiders can realistically do in such places. It orders the absence of a development bargain on a ladder: conflict, fragility, and the many stable elite bargains that are not developmental. Stabilization must come first where no elite bargain exists, and aid may help or hinder this.

Keywords: Foreign aid; Elites; Bargaining; Political settlements; Legitimacy; Fragile states (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
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