Power fragmentation and the resource curse

Rabah Arezki and Grégoire Rota-Graziosi

No wp-2026-7, WIDER Working Paper Series from World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER)

Abstract: This paper explores the economic consequences of (taxing) power fragmentation using both theory and data. We first formalize tax policy as the result of interministerial competition where the Minister of Finance ('Guardian') and the Minister of Mines ('Spender') have distinct objective functions, whereby the former attempts to stop the latter from extending tax incentives to attract investment in the sector.

Keywords: Institutions; Tax policy; Resource curse (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-env, nep-min and nep-pbe
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