What do outside experts bring to a committee? Evidence from the Bank of England

Stephen Hansen and Michael McMahon

Economics Working Papers from Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra

Abstract: We test whether outside experts have information not available to insiders by using the voting record of the Bank of England's Monetary Policy Committee. Members with more private information should vote more often against conventional wisdom, which we measure as the average belief of market economists about future interest rates. We find evidence that external members indeed have information not available to internals, but also use a quasi-natural experiment to show they may exaggerate their expertise to obtain reappointment. This implies that an optimal committee, even outside monetary policy, should potentially include outsiders, but needs to manage career concerns.

Keywords: Expert Behavior; Committees; Monetary Policy. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 E52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-cdm, nep-cta and nep-mon
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Working Paper: What Do Outside Experts Bring To A Committee? Evidence From The Bank of England (2015)
Working Paper: What Do Outside Experts Bring To A Committee? Evidence From The Bank of England (2010)
Working Paper: What Do Outside Experts Bring To A Committee? Evidence From The Bank of England (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:upf:upfgen:1238

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