What Do Outside Experts Bring To A Committee? Evidence From The Bank of England

Stephen Hansen and Michael McMahon

The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) from University of Warwick, Department of Economics

Abstract: We test whether outside experts have information not available to insiders by using the voting record of the Bank of England's Monetary Policy Committee. Members with more private information should vote more often against conventional wisdom, which we measure as the average belief of market economists about future interest rates. We nd evidence that external members indeed have information not available to internals, but also use a quasi-natural experiment to show they may exaggerate their expertise to obtain reappointment. This implies that an optimal committee, even outside monetary policy, should potentially include outsiders, but needs to manage career concerns.

Keywords: Expert Behavior; Committees; Monetary Policy JEL Classification: D70; E52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba and nep-cta
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Working Paper: What Do Outside Experts Bring To A Committee? Evidence From The Bank of England (2015)
Working Paper: What Do Outside Experts Bring To A Committee? Evidence From The Bank of England (2010)
Working Paper: What do outside experts bring to a committee? Evidence from the Bank of England (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wrk:warwec:946

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