Secret information acquisition in Cournot markets

Esther Hauk and Sjaak Hurkens

Economics Working Papers from Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra

Abstract: Two-stage game models of information acquisition in stochastic oligopolies require the unrealistic assumption that firms observe the precision of information chosen by their competitors before determining quantities. This paper analyzes secret information acquisition as a one-stage game. Relative to the two-stage game firms are shown to acquire less information. Policy implications based on the two-stage game yield, therefore, too high taxes or too low subsidies for research activities. For the case of heterogeneous duopoly it is shown that comparative statics results partly depend on the observability assumption.

Keywords: Information acquisition; oligopoly; uncertainty; Bayesian equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D43 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996-03, Revised 1997-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Secret information acquisition in Cournot markets (2001)
Working Paper: Secret information acquisition in cournot markets (1997)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:upf:upfgen:233

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