Secret information acquisition in Cournot markets

Esther Hauk and Sjaak Hurkens

Economic Theory, 2001, vol. 18, issue 3, 681 pages

Abstract: Two-stage game models of information acquisition in stochastic oligopolies require the assumption that firms observe the precision of information chosen by their competitors before determining quantities. This paper analyzes secret information acquisition as a one-stage game. Relative to the two-stage game firms are shown to acquire less information. Policy implications based on the two-stage game yield, therefore, too high taxes or too low subsidies for research activities. For the case of heterogeneous duopoly we briefly discuss comparative statics results.

Keywords: Information acquisition; Oligopoly; Uncertainty; Bayesian equilibrium. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D43 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-06-11
Note: Received: August 9, 1999; revised version: May 31, 2000
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (23)

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00199/papers/1018003/10180661.pdf (application/pdf)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted

Related works:
Working Paper: Secret information acquisition in cournot markets (1997)
Working Paper: Secret information acquisition in Cournot markets (1997)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:joecth:v:18:y:2001:i:3:p:661-681

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... eory/journal/199/PS2

Access Statistics for this article

Economic Theory is currently edited by Nichoals Yanneils

More articles in Economic Theory from Springer, Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().