Self-serving biases: Evidence from a simulated labor relationship

Gary Charness and Ernan Haruvy

Economics Working Papers from Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra

Abstract: Previous studies have found evidence of a self-serving bias in bargaining and dispute resolution. We use experimental data to test for this effect in a simulated labor relatonship. We find a consistent discrepancy between employer beliefs and employee actions that can only be attributed to self-serving biases. This discrepancy is evident through stated beliefs, revealed satisfaction, and actual actions. We present evidence and discuss implications.

Keywords: Experiment; fairness; labor relations; self-serving bias; Leex (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C91 D21 J30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-lab and nep-ltv
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: SELF-SERVING BIASES: EVIDENCE FROM A SIMULATED LABOUR RELATIONSHIP (1999)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:upf:upfgen:370

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