A general class of adaptative strategies
Sergiu Hart () and
Economics Working Papers from Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra
We exhibit and characterize an entire class of simple adaptive strategies, in the repeated play of a game, having the Hannan-consistency property: In the long-run, the player is guaranteed an average payoff as large as the best-reply payoff to the empirical distribution of play of the other players; i.e., there is no "regret." Smooth fictitious play (Fudenberg and Levine ) and regret-matching (Hart and Mas-Colell ) are particular cases. The motivation and application of this work come from the study of procedures whose empirical distribution of play is, in the long-run, (almost) a correlated equilibrium. The basic tool for the analysis is a generalization of Blackwell's [1956a] approachability strategy for games with vector payoffs.
Keywords: Adaptive strategies; approachability; correlated equilibrium; fictitious play; regret (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D7 C6 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-gth and nep-mic
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Journal Article: A General Class of Adaptive Strategies (2001)
Working Paper: A General Class of Adaptive Strategies (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:upf:upfgen:373
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