A general class of adaptative strategies

Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell

Economics Working Papers from Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra

Abstract: We exhibit and characterize an entire class of simple adaptive strategies, in the repeated play of a game, having the Hannan-consistency property: In the long-run, the player is guaranteed an average payoff as large as the best-reply payoff to the empirical distribution of play of the other players; i.e., there is no "regret." Smooth fictitious play (Fudenberg and Levine [1995]) and regret-matching (Hart and Mas-Colell [1998]) are particular cases. The motivation and application of this work come from the study of procedures whose empirical distribution of play is, in the long-run, (almost) a correlated equilibrium. The basic tool for the analysis is a generalization of Blackwell's [1956a] approachability strategy for games with vector payoffs.

Keywords: Adaptive strategies; approachability; correlated equilibrium; fictitious play; regret (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C6 C7 D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-gth and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Chapter: A GENERAL CLASS OF ADAPTIVE STRATEGIES (2013)
Journal Article: A General Class of Adaptive Strategies (2001)
Working Paper: A General Class of Adaptive Strategies (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:upf:upfgen:373

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