A General Class of Adaptive Strategies

Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell

Game Theory and Information from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We exhibit and characterize an entire class of simple adaptive strategies, in the repeated play of a game, having the Hannan- consistency property: In the long-run, the player is guaranteed an average payoff as large as the best-reply payoff to the empirical distribution of play of the other players; i.e., there is no ``regret.'' Smooth fictitious play (Fudenberg and Levine [1995]) and regret-matching (Hart and Mas-Colell [2000]) are particular cases. The motivation and application of the current paper come from the study of procedures whose empirical distribution of play is, in the long-run, (almost) a correlated equilibrium. For the analysis we first develop a generalization of Blackwell's [1956a] approachability strategy for games with vector payoffs.

Keywords: adaptive strategies; approachability; correlated equilibrium; fictitious play; regret (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C6 C7 D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999-04-12, Revised 2000-03-23
Note: Type of Document - Scientific Word v.2.5. First version: March 1999. Revised: December 1999.
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Downloads: (external link)
https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/econ-wp/game/papers/9904/9904001.pdf (application/pdf)
https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/econ-wp/game/papers/9904/9904001.ps.gz (application/postscript)
https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/econ-wp/game/papers/9904/9904001.tex (application/x-tex)

Related works:
Chapter: A GENERAL CLASS OF ADAPTIVE STRATEGIES (2013)
Journal Article: A General Class of Adaptive Strategies (2001)
Working Paper: A general class of adaptative strategies (1999)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9904001

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Game Theory and Information from University Library of Munich, Germany
Bibliographic data for series maintained by EconWPA ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).