A General Class of Adaptive Strategies
Sergiu Hart () and
Game Theory and Information from EconWPA
We exhibit and characterize an entire class of simple adaptive strategies, in the repeated play of a game, having the Hannan- consistency property: In the long-run, the player is guaranteed an average payoff as large as the best-reply payoff to the empirical distribution of play of the other players; i.e., there is no ``regret.'' Smooth fictitious play (Fudenberg and Levine ) and regret-matching (Hart and Mas-Colell ) are particular cases. The motivation and application of the current paper come from the study of procedures whose empirical distribution of play is, in the long-run, (almost) a correlated equilibrium. For the analysis we first develop a generalization of Blackwell's [1956a] approachability strategy for games with vector payoffs.
Keywords: adaptive strategies; approachability; correlated equilibrium; fictitious play; regret (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D7 C6 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999-04-12, Revised 2000-03-23
Note: Type of Document - Scientific Word v.2.5. First version: March 1999. Revised: December 1999.
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Journal Article: A General Class of Adaptive Strategies (2001)
Working Paper: A general class of adaptative strategies (1999)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9904001
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