A theory of international conflict management and sanctioning

Nuno Garoupa and João Gata

Economics Working Papers from Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra

Abstract: In this paper we analyze sanctioning policies in international law. We develop a model of international military conflict where the conflicting countries can be a target of international sanctions. These sanctions constitute an equilibrium outcome of an international political market for sanctions, where different countries trade political influence. We show that the level of sanctions in equilibrium is strictly positive but limited, in the sense that higher sanctions would exacerbate the military conflict, not reduce it. We then propose an alternative interpretation to the perceived lack of effectiveness of international sanctions, by showing that the problem might not be one of undersanctioning but of oversanctioning.

Keywords: Conflict management; international sanctions; arms embargo; international political market; pressure groups (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D74 K33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: A Theory of International Conflict Management and Sanctioning (2002)
Working Paper: A Theory of International Conflict Management and Sanctioning (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:upf:upfgen:481

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