Corporate criminal law and organization incentives: A managerial perspective

Nuno Garoupa

Economics Working Papers from Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra

Abstract: Corporate criminal liability puts a serious challenge to the economic theory of enforcement. Are corporate crimes different from other crimes? Are these crimes best deterred by punishing individuals, punishing corporations, or both? What is optimal structure of sanctions? Should corporate liability be criminal or civil? This paper has two major contributions to the literature. First, it provides a common analytical framework to most results presented and largely discussed in the field. In second place, by making use of the framework, we provide new insights into how corporations should be punished for the offenses committed by their employees.

Keywords: Law Enforcement; Corporation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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Journal Article: Corporate criminal law and organization incentives: a managerial perspective (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:upf:upfgen:529

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