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The choice of titling system in land

Benito Arruñada () and Nuno Garoupa ()

Economics Working Papers from Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra

Abstract: This paper analyzes the choice of the socially optimal titling system assuming rational individual choices about recording, assurance and registration decisions. It focuses on the enforcement of property rights on land under private titling and the two existing public titling systems, recording and registration. When the reduction in the expected costs of eviction compensates the higher cost of initial registration, it is more efficient to introduce a registration system rather than a recording system. The development of private "title assurance" improves the standing of recording as compared to registration. This improvement depends, however, on the efficiency of the assurance technology and, also, on corrective taxation that is needed to align individual optimization, which disregards the transfer element in eviction, with social objectives.

Keywords: Land transfer; registration; property rights; title assurance; insurance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K11 K12 L85 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-03, Revised 2004-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law and nep-mic
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Journal Article: The Choice of Titling System in Land (2005) Downloads
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