Grads on the Go: The Effect of Franchise No-Poaching Restrictions On Worker Earnings

Brian Callaci, Matthew Gibson, Sergio Pinto, Marshall Steinbaum and Matt Walsh
Additional contact information
Brian Callaci: Open Markets Institute
Matt Walsh: Lightcast

No 24-405, Upjohn Working Papers from W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research

Abstract: We evaluate the nationwide impact of the Washington State attorney general’s 2018-2020 enforcement campaign against no-poach clauses in franchising contracts, which prohibited worker movement across locations within a chain. Implementing a staggered difference-in-differences research design using Burning Glass Technologies job vacancies and Glassdoor salary reports from numerous industries, we estimate a 6 percent increase in posted annual earnings from the job vacancy data and a 4 percent increase in worker-reported earnings.

Keywords: Employer market power; oligopsony; monopsony; franchising chains; antitrust; wages; salaries (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J31 J42 K21 L40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-law and nep-lma
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