An axiomatic characterization of the strong constrained egalitarian solution

Francesc Garrés and Misericòrdia Vilella Bach

Working Papers from Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics

Abstract: In this paper we axiomatize the strong constrained egalitarian solution (Dutta and Ray, 1991) over the class of weak superadditive games using constrained egalitarianism, order-consistency, and converse order-consistency. JEL classification: C71, C78. Keywords: Cooperative TU-game, strong constrained egalitarian solution, axiomatization.

Keywords: Jocs cooperatius; Negociacions -- Models matemàtics; 33 - Economia (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/2072/203157

Related works:
Journal Article: An axiomatic characterization of the strong constrained egalitarian solution (2013)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:urv:wpaper:2072/203157

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Ariadna Casals ().