An axiomatic characterization of the strong constrained egalitarian solution

Francesc Llerena () and Cori Vilella ()
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Francesc Llerena: Universitat Rovira i Virgili
Cori Vilella: Universitat Rovira i Virgili
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Francesc Llerena Garrés

Economics Bulletin, 2013, vol. 33, issue 2, 1438-1445

Abstract: In this note we axiomatize the strong constrained egalitarian solution (Dutta and Ray, 1991) over the class of weak superadditive games using constrained egalitarianism, order-consistency, and converse order-consistency.

Keywords: Cooperative TU-game; strong constrained egalitarian solution; axiomatization. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-06-14
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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