The equity core and the Lorenz-maximal allocations in the equal division core

Francesc Garrés and Misericòrdia Vilella Bach

Working Papers from Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics

Abstract: In this paper, we characterize the non-emptiness of the equity core (Selten, 1978) and provide a method, easy to implement, for computing the Lorenz-maximal allocations in the equal division core (Dutta-Ray, 1991). Both results are based on a geometrical decomposition of the equity core as a finite union of polyhedrons. Keywords: Cooperative game, equity core, equal division core, Lorenz domination. JEL classification: C71

Keywords: Jocs cooperatius; 33 - Economia (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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http://hdl.handle.net/2072/212194

Related works:
Journal Article: The equity core and the Lorenz-maximal allocations in the equal division core (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:urv:wpaper:2072/212194

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