European Integration: Partisan Motives or Economic Benefits?

Patricia Esteve González () and Bernd Theilen ()

Working Papers from Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics

Abstract: In this paper we examine the influence of economic factors to explain partisan support for European integration over the last three decades. We find that partisan support is larger in `poorer' countries with direct economic bene fits from EU membership. On the contrary, parties in countries aff ected by the Maastricht criteria are more Euro-sceptical. Moreover, we find weak evidence for larger partisan support in countries with more developed welfare states, and that the support for European integration fluctuates in parallel with the business cycle. Finally, our results indicate that the importance of economic factors in determining partisan support for European integration has grown in recent periods. JEL classi fication: F15, F42, F53, F55, H60. Key words: European Integration; Partisan Ideology; Maastricht Criteria; European Budget; Benefi ts from Trade.

Keywords: Europa -- Integració econòmica; Pressupost -- Comunitat Europea; Països de la; 339 - Comerç. Relacions econòmiques internacionals. Economia mundial. Màrqueting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eec and nep-pol
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http://hdl.handle.net/2072/225297

Related works:
Working Paper: European Integration: Partisan Motives or Economic Benefits? (2014)
Working Paper: European Integration: Partisan Motives or Economic Benefits? (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:urv:wpaper:2072/225297

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