Generalized three-sided assignment markets: consistency and the core

Ata Atay, Francesc Llerena Garrés and Marina Núñez ()

Working Papers from Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics

Abstract: A class of three-sided markets (and games) is considered, where value is generated by pairs or triplets of agents belonging to different sectors, as well as by individuals. For these markets we analyze the situation that arises when some agents leave the market with some payoff To this end, we introduce the derived market (and game) and relate it to the Davis and Maschler (1965) reduced game. Consistency with respect to the derived market, together with singleness best and individual anti-monotonicity axiomatically characterize the core for these generalized three-sided assignment markets. These markets may have an empty core, but we define a balanced subclass, where the worth of each triplet is defined as the addition of the worths of the pairs it contains. Keywords: Multi-sided assignment market, Consistency, Core, Nucleolus. JEL Classification: C71, C78

Keywords: Jocs cooperatius; 33 - Economia (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-net
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/2072/246962

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:urv:wpaper:2072/246962

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Ariadna Casals ().