Entry Selection

J.J.A. Kamphorst, Ewa Mendys-Kamphorst () and B. Westbrock
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Jurjen Johannes Antonie Kamphorst

No 10-02, Working Papers from Utrecht School of Economics

Abstract: It is well-known in the IO literature that incumbent firms maywant to deter entry by behaving as if they are efficient. In this paper we showthat incumbents may sometimes prefer to encourage entry by mimicking thebehaviour of a less efficient firm for the following reason.If the incumbent cannot deter potential efficient entrants, he may want toelicit entry by an inefficient firm who would not enter if he knows that theincumbent is efficient. The presence of the additional firm in the market preventsfurther entry. The incumbent then faces a less efficient competitor in the longrun.

Keywords: Duopoly competition; entry deterrence; signalling weakness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-com, nep-cta, nep-ent, nep-ind and nep-tid
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://dspace.library.uu.nl/bitstream/handle/1874/43894/10-02.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:use:tkiwps:1002

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Utrecht School of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Marina Muilwijk ().