EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Experiment on Gender Representation in Majoritarian Bargaining

Andrzej Baranski, D.J. da Cunha Batista Geraldes, Ada Kovaliukaite and James Tremewan

Working Papers from Utrecht School of Economics

Abstract: Does the gender composition of committees affect negotiations in majoritarian bargaining? We report the results of an experiment in which subjects are placed in triads to negotiate the division of a sum of money under majority rule and the gender composition of the group is manipulated, ranging from all female (FFF), female majority (FFM), male majority (MMF), to all male (MMM). Results show that men are more likely to make the opening offer, and contrary to our hypothesis, agreements are reached fastest in MMM and slowest in FFF. The proportion of grand coalitions is increasing in the number of females while minimal winning coalitions (MWCs) increase monotonically in the number of males. MWCs are disproportionately more likely to be same-gender in MMF, which leads to a gender gap in earnings compared to FFM. When provisional MWCs form prior to a final agreement, excluded men are more proactive than excluded women in attempting to break the coalition by making alluring offers, which partially explains why mixed gender MWCs are less frequent in MMF compared to FFM. Notably, some females adopt male-type behavior in MMF regarding their initial proposals and aggressiveness when left out from a MWC.

Keywords: Unstructured bargaining; gender differences; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp and nep-his
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
https://dspace.library.uu.nl/bitstream/handle/1874/415117/REBO_USE_WP_21_02.pdf

Related works:
Working Paper: An experiment on gender representation in majoritarian bargaining (2022) Downloads
Working Paper: An Experiment on Gender Representation in Majoritarian Bargaining (2021) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:use:tkiwps:2102

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Utrecht School of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Marina Muilwijk ().

 
Page updated 2022-09-23
Handle: RePEc:use:tkiwps:2102