Experiment on Gender Representation in Majoritarian Bargaining
D.J. da Cunha Batista Geraldes,
Ada Kovaliukaite and
Working Papers from Utrecht School of Economics
Does the gender composition of committees affect negotiations in majoritarian bargaining? We report the results of an experiment in which subjects are placed in triads to negotiate the division of a sum of money under majority rule and the gender composition of the group is manipulated, ranging from all female (FFF), female majority (FFM), male majority (MMF), to all male (MMM). Results show that men are more likely to make the opening offer, and contrary to our hypothesis, agreements are reached fastest in MMM and slowest in FFF. The proportion of grand coalitions is increasing in the number of females while minimal winning coalitions (MWCs) increase monotonically in the number of males. MWCs are disproportionately more likely to be same-gender in MMF, which leads to a gender gap in earnings compared to FFM. When provisional MWCs form prior to a final agreement, excluded men are more proactive than excluded women in attempting to break the coalition by making alluring offers, which partially explains why mixed gender MWCs are less frequent in MMF compared to FFM. Notably, some females adopt male-type behavior in MMF regarding their initial proposals and aggressiveness when left out from a MWC.
Keywords: Unstructured bargaining; gender differences; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp and nep-his
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Working Paper: An experiment on gender representation in majoritarian bargaining (2022)
Working Paper: An Experiment on Gender Representation in Majoritarian Bargaining (2021)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:use:tkiwps:2102
Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Working Papers from Utrecht School of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Marina Muilwijk ().