"Where Ignorance is Bliss, 'tis Folly to be Wise": Transparency in Contests

Philipp Denter, John Morgan and Dana Sisak

No 1128, Economics Working Paper Series from University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science

Abstract: Increasingly, lobbying groups are subject to transparency requirements, obliging them to provide detailed information about their business. We study the effect this transparency policy has on the nature of lobbying competition. Under mild conditions, mandated transparency leads to an increase in wastefulness of lobbying competition and a decline in expected allocative efficiency. Hence we identify a negative side-effect of transparency policy, which also has implications for various other fields such as political campaigning or firm competition.

Keywords: Transparency Policy; Rent-seeking Contests; Information Disclosure; Value of Ignorance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D82 L12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 44 pages
Date: 2011-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (18)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:usg:econwp:2011:28

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