Marginal Deterrence, Escalating Penalties and Enforcement Inconsistency

Marcello Basili and Antonio Nicita ()

Department of Economic Policy, Finance and Development (DEPFID) University of Siena from Department of Economic Policy, Finance and Development (DEPFID), University of Siena

Abstract: The Law and Economics literature on public law enforcement has generally treated separately the issue of marginal deterrence from that of punishing repeated offenders though escalating penalties. We extend the model provided by Emons (2003) to show how pursuing both policies may generate an inconsistent enforcement design.

Keywords: Marginal Deterrence; Recidivism; Escalating Penalties; Incapacitation. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:usi:depfid:0409

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