On Institutional Designs and Corruption by Imitation

Elvio Accinelli and Edgar Sanchez Carrera ()

Department of Economics University of Siena from Department of Economics, University of Siena

Abstract: Imitation is the sincerest form of flattery, and we claim the corruption is driven by imitative behavior for those agents facing an institutional design of corruption. So this paper analyzes an individual level approach and tackles the question of why people engage in corrupt exchange. We show that institutional design determines corruption and that there exists a threshold level in order to imitate the noncorrupt (honest) behavior.

Keywords: Corrupt behavior; Evolutionary dynamics; Imitative behavior; Institutions and operations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 D02 K42 P37 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo and nep-pke
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:usi:wpaper:616

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