Italian “Homicide Road Law”: Evidence of a Puzzle?
Marcello Basili () and
Filippo Belloc ()
Department of Economics University of Siena from Department of Economics, University of Siena
We analyse the effectiveness of Law 41/2016 (the so-called “homicide road law”), introduced in Italy in 2016 with the aim of reducing dangerous driving on Italian roads, through a system of escalating sanctioning, where the severity of the punishment is based on the type of injury caused by the road accident. We first explore theoretically the two-sided effect of Law 41/2016, in terms of general and marginal deterrence. Then, we exploit micro-data on the entire universe of road accidents in Italy in the period before and after Law 41/2016 and measure its effectiveness in reducing the number of fatal outcomes. The estimation results unveil that, after the introduction of Law 41/2016, both the extensive and the intensive margin of deaths in road accidents was not reduced, while, if anything, a weakly significant increase is observed in the extensive margin. The study may contribute to the optimal design of driving regulation both in Italy and in other countries.
Keywords: Homicide Road Law; Vertical Deterrence; Marginal Deterrence; Escalating Penalties; Hybrid Sanctions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eur, nep-law and nep-tre
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:usi:wpaper:781
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Department of Economics University of Siena from Department of Economics, University of Siena Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Fabrizio Becatti ().