Platform-mediated reputation systems in the sharing economy and incentives to provide service quality: the case of ridesharing services
Marcello Basili and
Maria Alessandra Rossi ()
Department of Economics University of Siena from Department of Economics, University of Siena
Abstract:
Sharing economy platforms often use reputation systems to actively perform a ‘regulatory’/control role, by excluding from access to the platform users with ratings below a given threshold. We provide a multiple case study analysis of 9 platforms and investigate through a simple inter-temporal choice model the effect of the design of this specific application of online rating systems on users/providers’ incentives to ensure a high level of service quality. Compliance with the platform’s behavioural rules is imperfect even with perfect reviews and even if riders cannot switch across platforms. It can be increased by linking remuneration to performance and by increasing the opportunity cost of reintegrating the endowment of reputation, also by influencing providers’ perception of the magnitude of this cost. Thus, there may be an efficiency rationale for the controversial choice to willingly preserve riders’ uncertainty as to the operation of the algorithm and for portability of reputation.
Keywords: sharing economy; shared mobility; reputation systems; ridesourcing; incentives; service quality; self-regulation. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D20 L59 L81 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pay
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
Downloads: (external link)
http://repec.deps.unisi.it/quaderni/787.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:usi:wpaper:787
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Department of Economics University of Siena from Department of Economics, University of Siena Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Fabrizio Becatti ().