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Do medical doctors respond to economic incentives?

Andreassen Leif (), Maria Di Tommaso () and Steinar Strøm

Department of Economics and Statistics Cognetti de Martiis. Working Papers from University of Turin

Abstract: A longitudinal analysis of married physicians labor supply is carried out on Norwegian data from 1997 to 1999. The model utilized for estimation implies that physicians can choose among 10 different job packages which are a combination of part time/full time, hospital/primary care, private/public sector, and not working. Their current choice is influenced by past available options due to a taste persistence parameter in the utility function. In the estimation we take into account the budget constraint, including all features of the tax system. Our results imply that an overall wage increase or a tax cut moves married physicians towards full time job packages, in particular to full time jobs in the private sector. But the overall and aggregate labor supply elasticities in the population of employed doctors are rather low compared to previous estimates

New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hea
Date: 2012-04
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Related works:
Journal Article: Do medical doctors respond to economic incentives? (2013) Downloads
Working Paper: Do Medical Doctors Respond to Economic Incentives? (2012) Downloads
Working Paper: Do Medical Doctors Respond to Economic Incentives? (2012) Downloads
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